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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
C .. \LYlX H. JOHNSOX, 
I) la i 11 tiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
COH~\VALL \VAREHOUSE CO~l­
P .. \XY and EBXEf-;T JA~lES, 
JJefc 11d ant.-.·-Appella1d0. 
Case No. 
10176 
BlUBF OF, PLAIN'l.,IFF-RESPONDEKT 
~'L\TE~IEXT OF THE 1\ATCRE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff on a thru stn~et, ~t>eond South in Salt Lake 
Cit~·, rtah, heading eatlt, was struck on left rear by de-
fendant truck southbound on rrhird \Vest and turning 
left after ~topping at stop sign. 
DlSPOSITlOX li\ LO\VER COURT 
(..\~ stated in Defendants' Brief.) The jury, as in the 
fir~t trial, found for Plaintiff, jndg1nent was entered, 
and motion for new trial was denied. 
RELIEF SOrGHT OX APPE.AL 
... iffirn1ance. 
ST~-1.TE~IEXT OF FACTS 
On .JLay 31, 1962, at approximately± :±3 o'clock, P . .JI., 
at ~eeond South and Third \Yest, Salt Lake City, rtah, 
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Plaintiff drove an automobile 20 to 25 l\LP.H. easterly :#1~ 
on Second South Street, there a thru street, on the int~iclt· ~~~· 
lane. Each street is 92 feet wide. Plaintiff's auto, when :. 1 
its left rear portion where struck was 77' 10" ( H-305) 
straight east into the intersection measuring from the 
curb line, was struck by Defendant's truck which was 
56'2" (R-505) south of the curb line into the intersection, 
turning left "in a circular manner" (R-436) to go east 
on Second South (Exhibit 2D1). Defendant truck had 
stopped for a stop sign at Second South, according to 
Plaintiff at the curbline (R-444), according to Defend-
ant's driver at pedestrian lane (R-431), waited for several 
cars to go by, then proceeded to turn left, Plaintiff esti-
mated at 10 to 15 miles per hour (R-522), Defendant 
driver estimated accelerating frmn 7 to "about 10" miles 
per hour (R-436). 
Plaintiff stated at the scene to the invt'stigating of-
ficer (R~410, Line 23), on deposition (Deposition P. 12, 
Line 22), at the first trial, an~ at the second trial ( R-512, 
Line 2.3) that he was "going over the tracks" ·when he saw 
the truck stopped. Although Plaintiff in deposition esti-
mated his distance then at 150 to 200 feet, it turns out the 
tracks are approximately 125' back from point of im-
pact (Exhibit 2D1) thus fixing Plaintiff's position, mov-
ing of course, as he observed defendant truck. 
Plaintiff agrees with defendant that "at the retrial 
... the evidence was substantially the same" (Defendant's 
Brief P. 17); therefore, the previous decision, l~tah Su-
preme Court No. 9921, in its statement of the facts and 
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o) 
eotH'Iu:-;ion~ <·an be adopt (•<L It <·oncludes the qtwstion of 
nt•gl ig<'TH'P and <'Oil t ributory negligence are jury ques-
tiom.;. It n·ad~, with respect to the facts, as follows: 
"In vi<·w of the jm·)''s fjndings ·we view the 
t•vidPne<' in a light nrost favorable to plaintiff. In 
~twh a light it would appear that plaintiff first 
ob:-;erved the truck which collided with his car 
whPn it wm; stopped at a stop sign on the north 
~idP of Second South and r:l--,hird West as he was 
tnrrcling in an easterly direction while crossing 
some railroad tracks west of '"l_lhird West on Sec-
ond South when he was about 150 feet frmn th:· 
inter~Pction and again when he was about 75 feet 
from the intersection of those streets. As he con-
tinued traveling he looked to the south and east 
and had entered the intersection when he looked 
to tlw north again which was in11nediately before 
he ·was struck by the truck. I-Ie \Yas traveling 
bdwePn 20 and 25 n1iles per hour. He was the 
favored driver to enter the intersection first if a 
vehicle was not already in it or so close to coming 
in as to constitute a hazard since he ·was traveling 
in an easterly direction and for traffic traveling in 
an easterly direction Second South Street was a 
through streef at its intersection with Third West 
~tn·<•t. .At that intersection there are stop signs 
for north, south and westbound traffic but not for 
eastbound traffic. The accident occurred about 
-t :-t.J p.rn. when traffic was heavy. Plaintiff was 
ahnost t-wo-thirds across Third vV est Street when 
the left rear side of his car was hit hy the truck. 
The intersection is about 95 feet \Yide on Third 
\Y Pst and about 92 feet wide on Second South 
frmn curb to curb . 
.. The driver of the truck estirnated that plain-
tiff's car was about 100 feet away frmn the inter-
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section when a traffic break occurred and he 
started to get into the intersection to make the 
turn into Second South. He estilnated his speed as 
between 7 and 10 miles per hour, although he had 
no speedometer in his truck. Plaintiff in the short 
space of time he saw the truck had the impression 
it was barreling into him. From the physical evi-
dence it appears that plaintiff's car was approxi-
mately 78 feet east of the west curb of Third West 
Street while the truck was about 56 feet south of 
the north curb of Second South Street when the 
impact occurred. 
"Although frorn the testinwny of the driver 
of the truck it could have been found that he first 
observed plaintiff's car when it was about 200 or 
150 feet from the west curb of Third VI est and 
about 100 feet away from the intersection when he 
started to make his turn at a speed of about 5 to 10 
miles per hour, these were 1nere estimates and the 
jury was not bound to believe them. 1'he jury 
found that plaintiff had not failed to yield the 
right of way. Such a finding can only be conson-
ant with a belief by the jury that the truck entered 
the intersection after plaintiff's car had already 
entered or at a time when plaintiff's car was close 
to the intersection and traveling at a rate of speed 
which would constitute an immediate hazard. 
"The traffic was heavy. Fron1 plaintiff's 
testimony the jury could reasonably have found 
that the truck was still stopped at the stop sign 
when plaintiff was 75 feet away fron1 the inter-
section when again observed by hi1n before the col-
lision. That plaintiff having observed the truck 
still stopped and being on a through street con-
tinued driving while observing traffic to the south 
and east. Thus there was a reasonable basis in the 
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evidE•nel~ for a findi11g that plaintiff was not guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law in 
failing to avoid allowing the truck to run into the 
lt-ft rear end of his ear. The question of whether 
plaintiff under the circun1stances disclosed by the 
evidence was guilty of contributory negligence 
which proxiinately caused the collision was one 
l'or detennination by the jury. The court there-
fore Prred in concluding that plaintiff was guilty 
of eontributory negligence as a matter of law and 
~ranting a judg1nent of non.,uit against him." 
Defendant complains (Defendants' Brief, P. 4) of 50 
instruction~, but Defendant requested 29, all of which 
Wl'l'P given or given in substance except a request for a 
din•eted verdict and one requesting a finding of no disa-
bility. Of the total instructions, there were 21 stocks, 
one on drunages, 7 of Plaintiff's requests given (in addi-
tion to dan1age instruction), 2 frarned by the court (No. 
:!.7 and No. 29) (R. 353 and R-355), and 19 of Defendants' 
reqnPsts given verbatin1 (Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
1-l. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23). (R-331 to R-349). 
ARGUniENT 
POINT I. INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
Section -±1-G-7-±.10, Utah Code Annotated, reads as 
follows: 
"(a) In the event that a driver, after having 
driven past a yield sign or a stop sign, is 
involved in a collision \Yith a pedestrian 
having right of way in a crosswalk or a 
vehicle having right of way in the inter-
section such collision shall be deemed prima 
facie evidence of his failure to yield the 
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right of way as required by this section, 
but shall not be considered negligence per ;:; 
se in determining legal liability for such 
accident." 
Instruction No. 27 read as follows (R-353) : ]1: 
' "The laws of State of Utah provide that 
where a driver has driven past a stop sign into an 
intersection and a collision occurs, the collision 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the failure 
to yield the right of way on the part of the driver 
passing the stop sign but shall not be considered 
negligence per se in determining legal liability for 
such accident. 
Defendants apparently complain that in Instruction 
No. 27 there should have been inserted after the first 
clause the words "with a vehicle having right of way in 
the intersection." 
We are then concerned, and this court must deter-
mine, whether the words in the statute just referred to, 
"vehicle having right of way in the intersection," refer 
to the vehicle on the thru street, as generally having 
"right of way" because of the nature of the intersection, 
or whether such words refer to the ultimate determina-
tion of who has the right of way in the particular situa-
tion. 
It is submitted and urged that said words "vehicle 
having right of way in the intersection" in said statute 
refer to the vehicle on the thru street (or otherwise en-
titled by the nature of the intersecton or regulation signs, 
etc., to the position of favored driver). 
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The n·ason /t lw words "vehich• having right of 
\\'il~· in tlw int(·r~t>dion" wPn· unnecessary in this instruc-
tioll, ~o. :27, is that the jury kuew by ample evidence not 
,li~ptdt>(l and indeed as a matter of law in this case (Ex. 
~IH) who \\'a~ on the thru street and who was entering, 
nnd didn't havp to be and should not be told to redeter-
mine this. In fact, to have told the jury to re-labor that 
qtu·~tion would have been confusing tv the1n. They then 
\rould have• wondered-regarding the 01nitted language 
"n•hieh• having right of way in the intersection" does 
that reft>r to vehicle on thru street-a matter not in dis-
putP-or to the ultilnate question of who is to blmne. 
The jury could not have been 1nisled by the instruc-
tion as givPn even if it is found to contain super techni-
eal error. The broad edict enacted by the statute in ques-
tion, -!1-G-7 -!.10, was that a driver entering a thru street, 
if lw is involved in a collision, is at first blush the driver 
failing in his duty. It is only c01nn1on sense enacted into 
::-;tatntP. 
That the words in the statute "vehicle having right 
of way in the intersection" refer to the vehicle, in such a 
rasP as this, which is on the thru street, is indicated by the 
title of the section, the title reading Failure to yield right 
of zray-Effect of collision-Rule on entering stop or 
yield intersection-Yield right of way. 
That section, -!1-6-7 ±.10 was enacted Laws of 1961, 
Chapter 86, Art. 2, House Bill X o. 159. It is not a part of 
the lTnifonn Yehicle Code. It has been proposed as a 
part, and the writer is inforn1ed Utah is the only state yet 
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to adopt it. The latest edition of the Unifonn Vehicle 
Code, 1962, Section 11-403, adopts a prilna facie rule 
against drivers driving past a yield sign without stop-
ping but has not included such a prima facie rule against 
a driver driving past a stop sign after stopping. Section 
11-403 reads: 
" .. Provided, however, that if such a 
driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle 
in the intersection after driving past a yield sign 
without stopping, such collision shall be deemed 
prima facie evidence of his failure to yield the 
right of way." 
The legislatures have gradually affirmed the posi-
tion generally taken by the motorist, that the vehicle en-
tering the thru street or turning left n1ust see that the 
way is clear. In Porter vs. Mut1~al Insurance Co., 10 Wis. 
2nd 314, 102 N.W. 2d ?72, noted in Fisher, Law of Right 
of Way and' Traffic Law Enforcement, 1964 pocket part, 
page 117, the court, in conunenting on the vVisconsin 
Revised Code and attempting to get at the intent of the 
legislature in the revised code, quoted the annotator of 
the legislative council as follows : 
"The present law relating to the right of way 
of left-turning vehicles seems to prescribe a shift-
ing of right of way. This is inconsistent with the 
popular notion that the driver of the left-turning 
vehicle must yield to through traffic ... Note the 
Uniform Vehicle Code no longer has this objec-
tionable provision for shifting of right of way 
from one driver to the other." 
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f n Lau' uf lli,r;ht of IV uy and Traffic Law Enforce-
mt·nt hy .Judge ]~dward C. Fisher, Associate Counsel, 
~orth\\'t'st rnivt·rsity Traffic Institute, the author com-
lllt>nb, 19G-± pocket pn rt, page 11~: 
''The objectionable 'shift' of right of "\vay 
from one driver to the other at son1e indefinable 
moment and in smne undisclosed 1nanner featured 
in all versions of the Uniform Traffic Code prior 
to the revision of 19G2 is now eliminated." 
And hl' further eonunents, 1964 pocket part, page 117: 
"By passage of lLB. 159 the Utah Legisla-
ture reinovPcl the shift frmn the left-turn rule." 
It is obYious the language allegedly i1nproperly mnit-
tecl from Instruction 1\ o. :27 refers to thu vehicle on the 
thru street and not to the vehicle ultiu1ately found to 
han• the right of way; therefore•, the instruction properly 
excluded this language. 
Bates vs. B,urns ( 1955), 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 P .2d 290, 
quoted in Defendants' Brief (P. 12), was decided several 
yt>ars prior to the 19Gl cnachnl'nt above quoted, that is, 
~l·dion 41-6-7 -±.lOa; therefore is no help. 
The trend of the law was long ago noted in Grat-
2;iano vs. Grudy, (19±8), 83 Ohio App. 265, 78 N.E. 2d 766, 
Fisher, 196± pocket part 108, where the court, in cmn-
menting on a left-turn case, said: 
"A careful consideration of provisions of the 
Code discloses a purpose to favor vehicles mov-
ing in a straight line over YPhicl:s changing. dir-
ection. Thus, traffic is kept n1ov1ng and vehicles 
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changing direction are not permitted to join the 
flow of traffic except upon observance of the con-
trolling rules of safety." 
Defendants' Brief, Page 11, claims that the same 
error was committed in the second trial as the first. This 
is not so. In the first trial, the Court erroneously instruct-
ed the jury that the entry of the Defendant driver "into a 
highway controlled by a stop sign, and his being involved 
in a collision in the intersection in this case, is prima 
facie evidence that Plaintiff had the right of way ... " 
In the second trial, the Court, after study with counsel 
in chambers of the decision of the Supreme Court cover-
ing the first trial, correctly instructed the jury (R-353) 
that the entry of the Defendant driver into an intersec-
tion "past a stop sign into an intersection and the col-
lision occurs, the collision shall be deemed prima facie 
evidence of the failure to yield the right of way ... " 
There is a vast difference between "prilna facie evi-
dence of the failure to yield the right of way" and "prima 
facie evidence that Plaintiff had the right of way." 
Defendants' Brief (P. 16) complains "In Instruction 
27 and 28 the trial court told the jury that l\Ir. Johnson 
had only to get involved in a collision to have the right 
of way, ... " Actually the court told the jury that if :Mr. 
Johnson was on a thru street and had a collision with a 
driver having driven past a stop sign, that such "collision 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence of the failure to 
yield the right of way on the part of driver passing the 
stop sign but shall not be considered negligence per se 
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in th•krmining legal liability for such accident"-and 
that is the law. 
POINT II. INSTRUCTIONS WERE CORRECT 
Dt•t't•JHlant;-; concede (Defendants' Brief, P. 14) "Ad-
mith·dly, in this case, correct instructions on right of way 
were given by the court, but these instructions did not 
han• the effPd of nullifying the erroneous prejudicial 
(•l'l'(•d of Instructions 27 and 28." 
It it:' sub1nitted that Instructions 27 and 28 were cor-
rPd and that other instructions referred to by Defend-
ants as colTPet instructions had they been given without 
an instruction covering the statute quoted, that is, 41-6-
i-!.10, would have been incorrect and would not have car-
ri('d out the legislative intent. 
Defendants claim (Brief P. 11) that "Instruc-
tion :2S in effect directed right of way in favor of the 
plaintiff, as that instruction told the jury the fact of col-
lision is prilua facie evidence of defendant's failure to 
yield the right of way, and, hence, of negligence on their 
part." Instruction 28 (H-35-±) defined pri1na facie negli-
gence and negligence per se and aparently did so cor-
redly and hardly can be said to "in effect directed right 
of ·way .... " 
Therefore, there is little need to comment on the 
eases cited for authority that correct instructions cannot 
cure erroneous instructions. 
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It is eh1nentary that error to be reversible must be :le 
prejudicial and inconsistencies not such as would alter 
the outcome of the case siiould avail Defendants little. 
POINT III. INSTRUCTIONS HEREIN WERE IN AC-
CORD WITH PRIOR DECISION. 
Again Instruction 9-L on the first trial is not the 
same as Instruction 27, second trial. In the first trial the 
court erroneously instructed the jury that "that the en-
try of the defendant driver 'into a highway controlled 
by a stop sign and his being involved in a collision in 
the intersection, in this case, is prima facie evidence that 
plaintiff had the right of way ... '"In the second trial the 
language was straightened out to be consistent with the 
statute and referred to "prin1a facie evidence of the fail-
ure to yield the right of way ... " (R-353) 
The instructions could not have been misunderstood, 
were not misleading, were in accordance with the statute 
and consistent with the prior decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
DWIGHT L. KING 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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I hereby certify that on this ........ day of September, 
1964, I mailed two copies of this Brief by U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to Raymond M. Berry, Attorney at 
Law, 455 East 4th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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